RELIGION, POLITY AND SOCIETY IN TURKEY (*)

Arsev BEKTAŞ (Ph.D.)
Asst. Prof. of Political Science
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Communications

There has been much talk in recent years both in the Turkish press and in popular journals, about the apparent visibility of Islam in social and political life. In other way, one feature of the Turkish society and polity of the 1980s that strikes any keen observer is the "revival" of Islam. One of the most important current socio-political issues in Turkey is secularism. The Islamic movement has become such a visible phenomena that in recent months various agencies of the state have started to collect information and write up official reports on the increasing threat of the clandestine activities of various groups seeking to re-institute the "Sheriat".

Turkey, being the first Islamic country to accomplish a profound cultural revolution, the core value of which was secularization, and having experienced a long period of modernization, might be expected to have reached a level of modernity, that would have by now rendered the issue of secularism obsolete. However, the question of secularism, especially in the form of state versus religion lingers on in the Turkish polity. Why after so long is the issue of secularism still a matter of heated debate in Turkey and what might account for the Turkish polity's failure to surmount the difficulties surrounding this particular issue? (1)

The issue of religion became politicized in Turkey following the secular discourse of the one-party period (1923-1946) denied any legitimacy to Islam in public life. As Toprak stated that "positivism replaced faith as the dominant, indeed the official, outlook. Islam was equated with reactionary and obscurantist political views which stood in the way of reform, development and progress. Meanwhile, acceptance or rejection of this equation came to delineate position along the political spectrum."(2)

In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, such concerns were shared by observers who talked about a relationship between "revival of Islam" in Turkey and Re-

(*) The first version of this article was presented at the conference on "The Iranian Revolution and its Influence on Turkey and the Gulf-the Role of Fundamentalism" University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA, December 4, 1990.
volution of Iran. We can say that there were some influences of Iranian Revolution on recent visibility of Islam in Turkey. However, Islamic resurgence in any Islamic country, including Turkey, should be view in terms of the internal and political dynamics of the country itself. External factors can only have the effect of intensifying this potential.

Our aim is to show some of the characteristics of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey together to explain the presence of this potential in Turkey because Turkey is almost a unique case in itself among the Islamic countries.

The Ottoman Background

In the Ottoman polity one comes across a "Muslim State" where the influence of the religion was constrained by many factors. In that polity, the concept of mülık i.e. temporal power, had been stretched to its limits. Drawing upon their Òrf-i Sultani, or sovereign powers, the Ottoman Sultans could issue laws and regulations which would do away with Islamic precedents. From the seventeenth century on, even the Sultans lost their charisma; charisma was gradually attributed to the state. The Sultans could now be deposed in the name of the state. As Heper stated that:

In other Muslim states the concept of the state as an instrument of worldly salvation is a rather recent development. Thus, early in the game the state in the Ottoman-Turkish polity was based largely upon "structural legitimacy" or independent belief in validity of the structures and norms. Although in developing their state system, the Ottomans initially drew upon the Iranian example, the two systems showed marked difference in that stages. Beginning in the sixteenth century the Safavid State itself started to lose its relative autonomy vis-a-vis the influential Shi'a hierarchy. In stark contrast, as early as the mid-sixteenth century the Ottoman began freely to flout the law of Islam (3).

Religious organization in the Ottoman Empire was part of the state bureaucracy, linked to the administrative structure of the state through a network of offices both on the state and provincial level (4). Serif Mardin would argue that this was partly due to the fact that "religious heterogeneity of the Ottoman Empire was a constant source of concern for Ottoman Statesmen" (5) and that control of religious matters was crucial to state affairs.

In functional and organization terms, association between the socio-political systems and religion, was a distinguishing characteristic of traditional Ottoman Society. Combining the dual functions of the spiritual leader of the strongest Muslim state
and the temporal ruler of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan-Caliph symbolized the Islamic ideal of a political community based on religious legitimacy. The office of the Seyhulu-Islam linked the institutionalized religious authority within the administrative network to the political decision making, mainly the Sultan. The Seyhulu-Islam was appointed by the Sultan while he in turn was the leader of the ulama corps. The Ulema (ulema was the collective name given to the learned men of religion who had important educational and judicial, in addition to religious, posts in Ottoman Turkey) became a well organized and powerful group within the administrative structure of the Empire and even became a hereditary class with immense wealth and power.

They acted as the imams (preaches in mosques), were teachers in the medrese (religious school), kadis (judges) entrusted with the duty to administer law, or muftis (jurisconsults) to see to it that new legal enactment or judicial cases confirmed to the Shariah. So the judicial and educational institutions were under the control of ulama. Through the institution of the "fetva" the ulama could even condemn the policy decisions of the Sultans. As Heper pointed out that "in fact, the so-called Muslim institution in that polity was a prop for and subservient to the state. Unlike their shia brethren, the Ottoman ulama did not equate temporal power with injustice. Instead, they thought that cooperation with, and an official status in, the political realm was the only way of exercising an effective restraining influence on the temporal power".

The Ottoman patrimonial bureaucracy carefully kept the institutions of civil society under its control the moment these attempted to gain autonomy from the state. One of the most important functions of religion in the Ottoman Empire was it being a force of social integration. It also acted as an intermediary between the individual and the state. Serif Mardin argues that while in the West there developed a network of secondary structures that gained autonomy from the state, the only source of collective identity in the absence of secondary structures that could stand as channels of identity formation in the Ottoman Empire.

In Ottoman society, there was no founding organization, as in the West, to defend particularistic class interests and protection of the individual came through membership in the Islamic community. In the political sphere, on the other hand, the most important function of religion was to secure the legitimacy of the Sultan and the Empire. The Sultan was seen as the representative of God not the people and political obedience was the duty of every Muslim subject since the political order had divine sanction.

The need for reform was already felt in the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth century but these remained as "indigenous attempts which, in general, centered around strengthening the authority of the central government." In the nineteenth century the technical superiority of the West, especially in its military, became a rea...
ity and this made Westernization seem to be the precondition of reform in the Empire. By the nineteenth century Westernization efforts were extended into the educational, legal and political institutions as well. It has been argued that the focus on Westernization prevented attempts of indigenous reforms of the existing socio-political structure of the Empire (13).

Constriction of the areas that used to be covered under religious law, allowed secularization in the legal system. The Sultans used more and more of their authority to enact a series of kanuns (non religious laws) and the ulama did not show opposition to the secular law making. Separate mazalim courts were set up to look into civil or criminal cases that involved administrative officials. In 1950, a commercial code was accepted which brought commercial cases outside the religious codes (14). As Toprak stated that "secularization attempts of the ulama and of Islam in the socio-political life of the Empire, particularly at the level of the Westernized elite cadres" (15). A consistent policy of Westernization was followed throughout the nineteenth and the last two decades of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century. A more complete elimination of the power of the ulama was to come with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

Cultural Revolution in the Republic

Similar to the nineteenth century reformers, the Kemalists that led the change to republican life in Turkey also viewed the problem of modernization with reference to Islam. The secularization process of the Turkish Republic strengthened state authority and control over the major aims of the Islamic/Ottoman, and in so doing, Kemalism tried to break down both the institutional strength of Islam and the symbolic structure of society. That which needed to be changed was defined by the religious system because it was believed that it had been the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire that led to its collapse in face of the West. "This insistence on changing Islamic institutions and structures prevented the modernizing elite of the Kemalist era from turning their attention to broader definitions of systemic change" (16).

Nationalism was put in a Western context in that the existence of the Turkish nation as a group of people sharing a common past did not become the basis of the movement but rather, was replaced by the idea that the Turkish nation was a people sharing a common future among the civilized nations of the West (17). If we accept Westernization as the ideology of the Kemalist revolution, that it becomes apparent that secularization efforts of the time were fighting against the alternative source of ideology which was Islam. It followed that the reforms led by the early republicans aimed at weakening the role of Islam in Turkish society. As Heper stated that:

This approach places Turkey in a unique position. The Kemalists
attempted to adopt territorial, and, later, linguistic rather than religious nationalism... The situation in most other Muslim countries is somewhat different. As a consequence of their earlier colonization by the Europeans there seems to be difficulty in responding positively to a West seen to be an attacker and the abode of infidels. This leads to a continued emphasis on Islam. At the local level of the individual, too, what was attempted was unlike the situation in the Arab countries. In Turkey the aim was reformation rather than a renaissance of Islam (18).

Rather than making religion a matter of private life, the Kemalist regime tried to supervise and control religious activity by maintaining organizational links between religious institutions and the state bureaucracy (19). Religion was put under political control. Reforms aimed at secularization went along with the new administrative structure. Some of these were aimed at changing the role of Islam within society, others involved chances in the political and legal institutions (20). It should be noted that state control over religion and the westernizing reforms did meet with resistance during the early periods of the republic (21).

Particularly significant in setting the institutional basis of religion in Turkey and therefore significant in the political role of religion is the organization of religious affairs within the political system since 1923. Orthodox Islam is under the jurisdiction of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA - Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) whose president is appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the nomination of the Prime Minister. The PRA has regional offices called the müftülük in provinces (il) and subprovinces (ilçe) and these control the administration of the religious institutions under their jurisdiction and supervise all religious services. As civil servants 52,000 personnel of the PRA function under state control (22). The graduates of religious schools staff the PRA, and the teachers, textbook and curricula of these schools are under the supervision of the Directorate-General of Religious Education (Din Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü) which is a separate office within the Ministry of Education (23).

As Şerif Mardin argues, the secularist reforms from above and the institutionalization of secularism at the level of the polity was in place by 1946, when the Turkish Republic changed from a single-party period to a multi-party system, and the authoritarianism of the single-party years was crucial in establishing this (24).

Consequently, the question of Westernization was settled with the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The dominant paradigm of the new republican elite was Westernization. For the republican cadres, the term civilization was culture-bound. It was not something to be seen in relative terms vis-a-vis the culture of different people.
It was a concept that made sense only within the context of the West. A civilized nation meant a nation which belonged to the Western world. Although this new republican ethos was challenged by groups acting in the name of Islam, some of which rose up in a series of bloody rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s, the republican elite had rapidly consolidated their power and were able to effectively suppress or silence the religious opposition.\(^{(25)}\)

As Toprak stated that "the cornerstone of the cultural transformation of Turkey into a Westernized nation-state process was the concept of secularization and its translation into state policies. State policies came to include the strict control of religious functionaries, sects, groups and movements. Religions functionaries in mosques became civil servants. The tarikat network was outlawed.\(^{(26)}\) No comparision can be made between these orders and, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that fully emerged in place of the declining Sufi orders by World War II. In Iran, a more elaborate, though of course different, type of religious organization existed.\(^{(27)}\)

**The Multi-Party Period: 1945s to Present**

Religion in Turkey, especially during the early republican, single-party period, has been an important force with the potential of demanding a change of the political system. The Republican People’s Party (RPP- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), in the footsteps of the Kemalists,\(^{(28)}\) had a quite radical understanding of secularism throughout the early period. Reactionary movements at the time did create a gap between the elite and the mass culture because modernizing meant Westernization and not a promotion of folk culture and tradition.

As a result, with the multi-party system, religion was pulled back into politics in the platforms of some of the parties as a part of competition for votes. The Democrat Party (DP-Demokrat Parti), which ruled between 1950 and 1960, was in continuous conflict with the RPP over interpretation of secularism and the role religion could play in political affairs.\(^{(29)}\) As Toprak pointed out that:

> Throughout the 1950s, the Democrats were accused by the opposition for their policies alleged to undermine the secular principles of the Republic in an effort to gain votes. The minor revisions of policy that they implemented, such as the lifting of the ban on the recital of the ezan (call to prayer) in Arabic, the broadcasting of Koran reading over the state radio, the establishment of religious schools and the expansion of the PRA’s budget, were heavily criticized by both the secular press and the RPP leaders as major steps toward the establishment of a non-secular state.\(^{(30)}\)
This controversy over the politicization of Islam continued after the 1960 military intervention with the establishment of the Justice Party in 1961 which now replaced the DP as the target of secularist attack during the first half of the 1960s. The 1961 Constitution had allowed genuine associational freedom which resulted in the mushrooming of organizations throughout the decade, including religious ones. As Toprak added that:

Religious forces were finally able to establish a political party of their own in 1970 under the name, the National Order Party (NOP-Milli Nizam Partisi) which, however, was outlawed in 1972 by the Constitutional Court. The NOP leadership quickly reassembled and founded the National Salvation Party (NSP-Milli Selamet Partisi) which, as it turned out, would play a crucial role in the political arena during the 1970s(31).

The party activities of the NSP during the 1970s is against the secularist aspects of Kemalism. The rise of the NSP coincided with a period in Turkish history when, for the first time, institutions of civil society were beginning to develop considerable autonomy in the liberal atmosphere of the 1970s, the NSP was able to make considerable inroads into party competition. The NSP was a neo-Islamic party whose major concern was the partial retraditionalization of Turkish culture along Islamic precepts. Its ideology was called the "National Outlook" (Milli Görüş). It became an indispensable partner in three coalition governments between 1973-1978. It polled 11.8 and 8.6 per cent of the total votes in the 1973 and 1977 elections respectively. The NSP also built a considerable patronage network through placing the NSP sympathisers in various ministerial and other governmental positions. Following the military intervention of 1980 the NSP, along with all the other political parties, was outlawed (32).

As the Turkish electorate realigned itself under the major parties, a new neo-Islamic party, Welfare Party (WP-Refah Partisi) was founded in 1983 to fill the gap after the closing of the NSP. "The WP emerged on the political scene to realign the 'Muslim vote'. It was unable to acquire legal status before the 1983 national elections and was left out of competition. It was however, able to participate in the municipal elections of March 1984 and received 4.8 per cent of the total votes. Reminiscent of the "National Outlook" of the NSP, the WP calls its ideology "National Consciousness" (Milli Suur)"(33).

Consequently, there is little possibility for religion in Turkey to be a functional alternative to politics, which is not the same thing as political movement taking on a religious coloring. Turkey seems to have a distinctly modern political system as compared to other Muslim polities as a field of human activity makes sense in its own right and can function without religious props.
One factor that accounts for the low electoral support of the WP, therefore, is

The WP is renowned to have connections with the Naksabandi order, and Toppaz stated that: "Discipline: the power of the executive (36) As Toppaz stated that: "Discipline: the power of the executive..."
Until late 1985, the strength of the NSP sympathizers within the MP leadership was also evident in their control of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports which has always been considered a key ministry by Islamic groups. Some controversial policies and decisions of the government reflect the influence of this faction, an influence rooted in the mass appeal it enjoys. The former Minister, Vehbi Dinçerler, was a center of attention in the Turkish press for his unprecedented decisions (39). These decisions prompted one Turkish writer to entitle a recent article "Turkey: Secular or Islamic?" (40).

Indeed, like in the 1950s, there has been much talk of a revival of Islam in Turkey in recent years. The entrenchment of the Islamist within the MP government, the existence of an Islamic Party, the wealth of Islamic publications and periodic press reports about several incidents involving Islamic groups has once again put the question of religion on the agenda of the Turkish secularist intellectuals. As Toprak stated that:

Several reports about private Koran Courses (41) which were supposed to be terminated after 1980, indicated that they were still in operation under different names and had become an arena in the fight for control between the Süleymançılı and Nurculu orders. Another involved fourteen Naksı bendis, including the powerful Nakşı bendı Sheikh Raşit Erol, who were accused of cooperating with a fundamentalist organization in Saudi Arabia, the Rabitat-al-Alem-al-Islam, in order to start an armed uprising with the aim of establishing a "theocratic state" in Turkey based on the Shari‘a ... The much publicized issue of female students who believe in tesettür (Islamic precept for the covering of women’s bodies and hair) who refuse to lift their scarfs during school hours, was yet another example of Muslim militancy for the secularists" (42).

As the foregoing illustrates, the case of Islam points to the precarious nature of the relationship between the state and civil society in Turkey. Above all, it points to limits of state power even in a state-centered polity. Despite half a century of attempts to put religion under state control, the role of Islam in Turkish society and politics remains influential. Part of the reasons for this situation lie in the shaping of voter alignments in Turkey. As in the case in most democracies the choices of the voter have been historically crystallized. Indeed, the trends in Turkish politics can be mapped through cleavage clusters in Turkish society which shape not only the behavior of the voter but also the structuralization of politics itself.

Islam as a political force is an integral part of this pattern spectrum. However, the electoral fortunes of Islamic parties in Turkey also demonstrate that Islam, by itself, is not a sufficient catalyst for mass mobilization. The Turkish case seem to differ significantly from other Muslim countries. Both the economic development of Tur-
key, and the implementation of strict secularist policies over a long period of time, have pushed the issue of religion to the background of electoral politics.

Despite the fact that electoral behavior in Turkey does not seem to accept Islam as an alternative political ideology by itself, all the attempt to put religion under state control have not been able to stop the role of Islam in Turkish society and politics. Actually, while during the early years of the Republic, religion was confined to groups who were predominantly rural, uneducated and outside the ruling elite, recently it has become a counter culture which has extended itself to prominent sectors of urban society such as the civil service, free professions, political parties and the press.

Conclusion

Although the picture emerging from the above discussion superficially suggests an increasing significance of Islam in Turkish politics, there is, in fact, little to be found to argue that the Islamic forces could not have become a viable political alternative had the Iranian revolution not influenced Turkey in 1980s. However, as has been argued above, a mass political movement based on religious appeals has little chance of success in modern Turkey. In the last analysis, socio-economic changes undergone by the country since 1983, coupled with state dominance over religious institutions and forces, have pushed the significance of Islam into the background, as economic and social structural factors gained importance both in national politics and at the individual level. Islam, by itself, is no longer a sufficient force for mass mobilization. Islamic "revival" therefore, should be understood within the Turkish context as the outcome of an increasingly pluralist society during the 1970s. From the mid-1960s until the military intervention of 12 September 1980, the country witnessed an unprecedented growth of ideological movements represented by various political parties, institutions and organizations. This period in Turkish history was probably the most liberal in term of allowing social forces the freedom of expression, even the Military Intervention of 1971 and various declarations of martial law did not succeed in stopping this trend toward pluralism. Islamic movements were only one, among several such forces. And they were not the most militant in demanding regime change.

However, the influence of the Iranian Revolution on the visibility of Islam in the Turkish society should not be completely ignored. The prevalent issue of female students who believe in tesettur and who refuse to lift their scarfs during school hours intensified. On the other hand, it was rumored that some agent provocateurs have gone into Turkey from some countries (not only Iran but also Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya) for performing certain Islamic rituals or supporting Islamic demonstrations and terrorist movements.

We should point out that some Islamic orders and organizations are supported financially by some Islamic countries. These orders and organizations which are also
as active are the "Islami Cihad", the "Muslim Brotherhood", the "Humeynist", the "Nakshibendi", the "SuleymanCI" and the "Nurcu". All of these religious organizations aim at reversing the Kemalist secularization attempts and re-installing political system based or Islamic principles. It is rumored that they are being financially supported by above countries.

Depending on the circumstances religion is seen as offering a channel of protest, or security or a force that could lead a revolution towards the creation of a Muslim state. The role religion will play in Turkey will be determined on how it is manipulated and how the historic attempts of secularization are interpreted. On the other hand, as Saribay stated that the "revival of Islam" seems to present Turkish democracy with a dilemma. If democracy means a representation of all the people and participation of every segment of the population in the political process, then the traditionally-oriented segment of the population who find a great appeal in the Islamic movement must also be represented (43).

Saribay added that "However, Islam as a political ideology implies the comprehensive control and arrangement of the social, cultural, economic and political activities of all members of the umma according to its own principles. It thus constitutes a threat to democracy by its exclusion on principle of the voice of secularly-oriented citizens in Turkey" (44).

Finally, even though secular circles in Turkish society express concern over the Islamic movements new visibility, their actions are not devoid of contradictions either. The Turkish population is 99 per cent Muslim. Thus, Islam is a critical factor in determining the moral values of Turks. Many threat Islam as a standard by which the daily sets of fellow citizens and others are to be judged. Islam is appealed to, on occasion, by those wishing to legitimate some innovation. Islam serves also as an important ideological tool in the competition for votes, one not commonly utilized by political parties bent on winning elections in Turkey. Moreover, the gap between the center and the periphery of the Turkish society persist with Islam serving both the elites of the center and the masses of the periphery as a device to bridge this gap.

In the last analysis: (1) no possibility of an overtly religious party to be elected in the political power, (2) due to the structure of the society, the possibility of a religious revolution similar to that in Iran is minimal, if not nil, (3) the third alternative is for the religious sectors to continue growing in political power if one of the parties which has overt religious tendencies is elected into political power through national elections under the auspices of economic liberalism.

NOTES

1.Ali Yaşar Saribay, "Religion in the Contemporary Turkish Society and Polity", 71
Current Turkish Thought, 58 (Spring, 1986): 2-24.
7. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp.31-32
20. Some examples of these reforms would be: (1) accepting the latin alphabeth in 1928, (2) substituting new words with Turkish roots in place of Arabic and Persian derivatives and creating the Turkish linguistic Society in 1932, (3) translating the Koran into Turkish and banning its recital in Arabic, (4) dropping Arabic and Persian from the curriculum of schools, (5) abolition of the Caliphate which had been part of the Ottoman Empire since 1517 (Selim I), (6) abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, (7) accepting western hat and clothing (1925), the gregorian calendar (1925), sunday holidays instead of Fridays (1935), European numerals (1928), the metric system (1931), and family names (1934), (8) dissolving the religious brotherhoods in 1925, (9) abolition of
the Shariah courts in 1924, (10) closing the medreses, (11) adapting the Swiss
Legal Code, the Italian Criminal Code and the German Commercial Code as
the basis of secular law etc. For a summary of these reforms see Binnaz Top-
rak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, pp.33-58; also see her fo-
ootes and bibliography for particular information on any of these reforms.

23.Ibid.
24.Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", Compar-
25.Şee Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals of the 1980s in Turkey", Current Tur-
26.Ibid., pp.4-5.
27.On the elaborate and critical functions of the religions orders in Egypt and Iran, see,
   Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt, pp. 202-203 and James A. Bill,
28.The shift to republican life was led by the national leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
   and the implemented changes (reforms) and the "ideology" behind these is of-
   ten referred to as Kemalism or Kemalist Revolution.
29. The 1946-1960 period was characterized by the conflict over the interpretation of
   secularism between the RPP in power during the single-party years, and the
   DP, which won the first free elections in 1950. See more detail analysis Feroz
   Ahmad "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey", Middle Eastern Studies, 1
   (January 1991), pp.3-21, and Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right" in Tur-
   key in Transition, eds., Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Ox-
31.Ibid., p.124.
32.On the National Salvation Party see Jacob M. Landau, "The National Salvation
   Party in Turkey", Asian and Affairs Studies, 11(1976): 1-57; Türker Alkan,
   "The National Salvation Party in Turkey" in Islam and Politics in the Mo-
   dern Middle East, eds., Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (London and
   Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), pp.79-102; Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye’de Mo-
   dernleşme Din ve Parti Politikası: "MSP Örnek Olayı" (İstanbul: Alan
   Yayıncılık, 1985).
34.Şee Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspec-
   tive", pp.245-265; Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and Political Participa-
   tion in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) and Ersin Ka-
   laycıoğlu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of
35.Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspec-
   tive", p.255. For an elaboration, see Süha Bölükbäşi, "Turkey Copes with Re-

36. See *Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Tercüman, Günaydın, Milli Gazete*, July 1, 1985.
38. See Teoman Erel in *Milliyet*, March 5, 1985 and June 19, 1985. On the other hand, Turgut Özal was an NSP candidate in the 1977 elections, but lost.
39. Among the decisions are the following: the decision of the Minister of Education, Youth and Sports to forbid girls from wearing "shorts" in the Youth Day Parade, the law banning the airing of beer commercial on Turkish TV, the effort to build a mosque at the Grand National Assembly complex, the drafting and subsequent adoption of a law punishing those who swear at monotheistic religious. For details see Binnaz Toprak "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", pp.131-133.
40. Sami Kohen, "Turkey: Secular or Islamic?", *Middle East Times*, June 2-9, 1984.
41. Binnaz Toprak stated that these are courses financed by citizens or local communities where the recital of the Koran is taught to students. See her footnotes, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", p.133.

42. Ibid.
44. Ibid.